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THE (FUTILE) SEARCH FOR A COMMON
LAW RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION:
BEYOND BRASIER’S IRRELEVANCE TO
(PERHAPS) RELEVANT AMERICAN CASES
Randolph N. Jonakait∗
INTRODUCTION
Recent interpreters of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause have “Frankensteined” Rex v. Brasier back into new life.
For over two centuries, no one seems to have thought the 1779
English case important for understanding the U.S. Constitution,
but now some see Brasier as infusing fresh content into the
Sixth Amendment’s right of confrontation.
Crawford v. Washington1 first breathed the life back into
Brasier. Even though the Framers of the Constitution hardly
discussed it,2 Crawford asserted that the Confrontation Clause
“is most naturally read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding.”3 This assertion assumes
∗

Professor, New York Law School. The author thanks Stephen Newman
and Amelia Jonakait for their suggestions.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause:
An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 77 (1995) [hereinafter, The
Origins of the Confrontation Clause]. “The origins of the Confrontation
Clause are murky. Early American documents almost never mention the
right, and the traditional sources for divining the Framers’ intent yield almost
no information about the Clause.” Id.
3
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. See also id. at 43 (noting that “The
founding generation’s immediate source of the [confrontation] concept . . .
was the common law”). Id.
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that there was a common law right of confrontation and implies
that cases can be found that shed light on this common law
right.4
For some who accept these assumptions, Brasier is such a
ruling, and although not mentioned by the Supreme Court in the
eighteenth, nineteenth or twentieth centuries, the Court’s two
recent Confrontation Clause cases have Brasier references,5 as
do briefs to the Court and academic discussions.6 Fairly read,
however, Brasier says nothing about the Confrontation Clause.
If a common law right of confrontation is to be found, we must
look elsewhere for the content of that right.
Part I of this Article identifies the most straightforward
reading of Rex v. Brasier. The decision was based on the
principle that out-of-court statements from an incompetent
witness could not be admitted in a criminal trial. The case says
nothing about the hearsay rule generally, hearsay exceptions, or
the right of confrontation.
Part II discusses a Framing-Era American case, State v.
Baynard,7 that is quite similar to, and consistent with Brasier.
Baynard excluded out-of-court statements from a witness who
would have been incompetent to testify in court, and it confirms
that Brasier said little, if anything, about a right of
confrontation. Baynard does, however, indicate that American
courts of the Framing Era had a general prohibition on hearsay.
Part III contends that if Framing Era views are to control the
4

See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of
Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 227 (2005):
[Crawford] has assumed that the Confrontation Clause was
incorporating a common law right of confrontation; therefore, an
English common law right of confrontation must be
discoverable. The cited English cases are assumed to be the
most relevant ones for determining the English right, and then a
right of confrontation is found in them. Without those
assumptions, that right is not apparent.
Id.
5
See infra at note 13.
6
See infra at notes 11-15, 19.
7
1794 WL 184 (Del. O. & T. 1794).
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meaning of today’s Confrontation Clause, it is American views
from that era that are the most important, and the best sources
of American viewpoints and ideas are American cases, not
English cases. This section will examine in detail one such case,
The Ulysses,8 while briefly referring to other, similar cases that
rule on the admissibility of out-of-court statements, and will
explore how American courts in the Framing Era enforced a
general prohibition on hearsay and recognized only limited
hearsay exceptions.
REX V. BRASIER

I.

In the 1779 case of Rex v. Brasier, Brasier was convicted of
assault with intent to commit rape of a girl under seven years
old. The girl did not testify and “was not sworn or produced as
a witness on trial.” Instead, the girl’s mother and a woman who
lodged with the mother testified that the girl “immediately on
her coming home, told all the circumstances of the injury which
had been done her. . . .” The case went to the Twelve Judges,9
who rendered a unanimous, single-paragraph opinion,
concluding that “the evidence of the information which the
infant, had given to her mother the other witnesses, ought not to
have been received.” The court’s full reasoning stated:
That no testimony whatever can be legally received
except upon oath; and that an infant, though under
the age of seven years, may be sworn in a criminal
prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict
8

24 F.Cas. 515 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No. 14,300).
See John Langbein, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
212-13 (2003). Langbein writes:
When a point of difficulty arose that a trial judge was reluctant
to decide on his own, especially when capital sanctions were
involved and the convict would otherwise be promptly executed,
the judge could defer sentencing and refer the question to a
meeting held back in London of all the judges, commonly
twelve, of the three common law courts.
Id.
9
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examination by the Court, to possess a sufficient
knowledge of the nature and consequences of an
oath . . . , for there is no precise or fixed rule as to
the time within which infants are excluded from
giving evidence; but their admissibility depends upon
the sense and reason they entertain of the danger and
impiety of falsehood, which is to be collected from
their answers to questions propounded to them by the
Court; but if they are found incompetent to take an
oath their testimony cannot be received. The Judges
determined, therefore, that the evidence of the
information which the infant had given to her mother
and the other witness, ought not to have been
received.10
Certainly, at first glance, the case is not an application of the
common law right of confrontation. The court neither said that it
was applying such a right, nor did the court indicate that such a
right existed. The opinion gave no inkling that the statement was
inadmissible because it had not been confronted, or that its
admission would deny the accused cross-examination. Crossexamination and confrontation go without mention, and the
opinion does not even refer to the disputed evidence as hearsay.
The case made no general pronouncements about out-of-court
statements, much less about hearsay exceptions.
It seems to take a highly creative, and perhaps a highly
anachronistic, eye to find a confrontation meaning in Brasier.11
Instead, the clearest rules from the case are that there is no fixed
age at which a child can be sworn in to testify and that a child
under seven years old can be sworn in to testify if the trial
court’s “strict examination” reveals that she understands the
nature and consequences of an oath.12
10

The decision concludes by noting that the “prisoner received a
pardon.. . . .” See generally, King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199 (K.B. 1779).
11
See Davis v. Washington, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 965, 54, stating about Brasier that “[i]t is hard to miss the
confrontation rhetoric” in it.
12
Brasier has been cited by American courts for the proposition that a
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Brasier clearly indicates that it was improper to admit the
child’s out-of-court statements. The court’s rationale, however,
cannot be meaningfully ascribed without answering now
unanswerable questions. For example, had the child been
produced at trial, and the court examined her and concluded that
she could be sworn, would her out-of-court statements have been
admissible?13
We cannot know whether the court was declaring that what
today would be known as an excited utterance was inadmissible.
Statements were made to the mother and the lodger
“immediately” upon the girl coming home, but the opinion does
not say exactly how long after the assault the girl made these
statements, and whether the assertions would today qualify as an
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is unclear.14
The facts point out the lack of substantial corroboration for
the girl’s statements by stating that “there was no fact or
circumstance to confirm the information which the child had
given, except that the prisoner lodged at the very place which
she had described, and that she, on seeing him the next day, had
child’s ability to take an oath is not dependent upon a fixed age. See, e.g.,
State v. Edwards, 79 N.C. 648, 650 (1878); People v. Bernal, 10 Cal. 66,
67 (1858).
13
The brief for Davis in Davis v. Washington contended that when the
Constitution was adopted, evidence of a fresh complaint of a sexual assault
was not admissible unless the victim testified. To support that proposition,
the brief referred to Brasier, saying “Thus, for instance, the King’s Bench in
1779 held that an alleged victim’s complaint made to her mother
‘immediately upon coming home’ from an alleged assault was inadmissible
because the victim was not sworn or produced as a witness on the trial.’”
Davis v. Washington, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS
965, *53-54. In the reply brief, Davis asserted that Brasier held that the
“children’s out-of-court statements were admissible only if they testified.”
Davis v. Washington, Reply Brief for Petitioner, 2006 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 305, at *18.
14
Cf. Hammon v. Indiana, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 949, 45, which concludes that Brasier’s holding demonstrates that “at
the time of the Framing, there was no special rule allowing admissibility of
accusatorial statements because they were made under stress of excitement.”
Id. at 45.
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declared that he was the man. . . .” There is no way to tell why
the court put such an emphasis on the absence of confirming
evidence, or whether additional corroboration would have made
the statement admissible.
The opinion only states that the girl was neither sworn nor
produced “on the trial.” Brasier does not mention whether the
girl was produced and sworn at a pretrial proceeding. If the
opinion was indicating anything about the about the admissibility
of sworn, pretrial statements, we cannot tell.
Brasier did state that “testimony” not under oath could not
be received and that if children “are found incompetent to take
an oath, “their testimony cannot be received.”15 The court then
concluded that the out-of-court statements should not have been
admitted. Perhaps the court was equating hearsay with
“testimony.”16 If so, Brasier might have modern importance
because Crawford’s reading of common-law history led it to
conclude that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as
evidence against the accused . . . .”17 Crawford went on to
conclude that the Confrontation Clause’s core concern was with
statements used against an accused akin to those from an ex
parte deposition or examination, which the Court labeled
“testimonial,” and held that out-of-court testimonial statements
of an absent declarant can only be admitted if the accused had
had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.18 Thus, if
Brasier was equating the girl’s statements with unsworn
15

See Hammon v. Indiana, Brief for Petitioner, 2005 U.S. S.Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 949, 44.
16
See id.(“Strikingly, and explicitly, the judges referred to the girl’s
statement as testimony.”); Hammon, Reply Brief for Petitioner, 2006 U.S.
S.Ct. Briefs LEXIS 329, 16 (noting that Brasier “characteriz[ed] the out-ofcourt accusation made by the child . . . as testimonial . . . and so exclud[ed]
it). See also Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15
J.L. & POL’Y 553, 564 (2007) (referring to girl’s statement as “testimony”).
17
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
18
Id. at 51-52.
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testimony, and in doing so was elucidating a common-law right
of confrontation, the case might tell us something about what
should be currently considered testimonial.19
The assumptions necessary to reach this modern meaning,
however, ought to give substantial pause. Occam’s razor
suggests that the simplest explanation should be accepted, and
the simplest explanation for Brasier is that it was only holding
that the attempted end-run around the competency rules by
admitting the out-of-court statements from one who was not
shown to be a competent witness was not valid. The opinion
says nothing about the admissibility of hearsay from a witness
who is capable of taking an oath,20 and does not say anything at
19

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006), did not state a
comprehensive definition of “testimonial” but did conclude:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecutions.
Id. The Court rejected Davis’ reliance on Brasier because it did not involve a
statement made during an ongoing emergency, concluding, “The case would
be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement had been the girl’s screams for
aid as she was being chased by her assailant. But by the time the victim got
home, her story was an account of a past event.” Id. at 2277.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the result in Crawford, cited
Brasier for the proposition that “[u]nder common law, although the courts
were far from consistent, out-of-court statements made by someone other than
the accused and not taken under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or
affidavits, were generally not considered substantive evidence upon which a
conviction could be based.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
20
Cf. Hammon v. Indiana, Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 44 (
noting that “the manifest premise of the judges’ discussion was that if the
speaker had been an adult it would have been plainly improper for other
persons to relay her accusations—her ‘testimony’—to court. . .”) Id. See also
Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J. L. & POL’Y
553, 565 (2007) (noting that “[a] premise of the [Brasier] debate was that if
she had been an adult the statement could not have been used. . .”).
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all about the content of the Confrontation Clause.
The crucial question, of course, is not what Brasier’s
rationale truly was, but how Americans would have treated a
comparable situation in the Framing Era. If a conception of the
common law was constitutionalized in the Confrontation Clause,
it would have been the American conception of that law. And
while attention has been paid to the English case, none seems to
have been paid to a quite similar Framing-Era American case,
the Delaware decision of State v. Baynard.21 In Baynard,
hearsay was excluded not because it did not fit into an exception
and not because it was not confronted, but because the out-ofcourt declarant was incompetent to testify at the trial.
II. STATE V. BAYNARD
In Baynard, a prosecution witness in a 1794 murder trial
testified that he had a conversation with the deceased on the
evening of the killing that concerned the deceased’s going to the
defendant’s house. The defendant Baynard “objected to this
evidence as hearsay. . . .”22 The defense counsel argued that the
out-of-court statements did not fall within any hearsay exception,
including explanatory evidence and dying declarations.23
The prosecutor responded that the hearsay was being
offered,
not as in every respect regular evidence in itself, but
as it would come in as introductory to that which was
21
22
23

Id.

1794 WL 184 (Del.O. & T. 1794).
Id.
Id. The attorneys for the defendant contended that:
it is illegal, considered as a hearsay evidence. It comes within none
of the exceptions in which hearsay evidence is admitted. It cannot be
considered as explanatory or illustrative of other evidence, for none
has yet been given. It cannot be admitted as relating the declarations
of a dying man, because at the time the person who is since
dead . . . could have had no contemplation of the future accident by
which he was deprived of his life.
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good legal evidence. . . . Very frequently narratives
would be quite unintelligible, if it were not permitted
to relate circumstances, which though illegal as
substantive evidence, may tend to introduce and
explain what is admissible.24
The court agreed with the defense that hearsay was generally
inadmissible, but also seemed to indicate that the particular
hearsay at issue might ordinarily be admissible: “Though the
rule be general that hearsay evidence is illegal, yet this rule is
subject to many exceptions. It would frequently be impossible to
take advantage of legal evidence, without an occasional
admission of hearsays to explain a narrative of facts.”25
This looks very much like a modern evidentiary debate. The
defense objects to an offered out-of-court statement as hearsay
and contends that it must be excluded since it does not fit into
any exception. The prosecution replies that the statement is not
being offered as “substantive” evidence, but that it should be
admitted solely to complete a narrative–an argument that seems
to say that it was not being offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. This call and refrain clearly emanate from the scripture
24

Id.
Id. at *1. In addition, the court stated, “It is proper also to give his
preface to his story, in most cases without interruption.” Id. See generally
Jonakait, supra note 2, at 161 (discussing an 1800 New York murder trial,
stating that witnesses generally started their testimony not by responding to
questions, but by delivering a narrative, which was sometimes interrupted by
a judge or opposing counsel, but the interruptions seem to have been limited
to clarifying ambiguities in the narrative and at the conclusion of the
narrative, however, questions and answers took over like in the modern
format).
See also Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design:” How the
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawrod-Davis
“Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Orginal Confrontation Clause,
15 J. L. & POL’Y 349, (2007) (discussing the contention that hearsay often
appeared in eighteenth-century English trials and concluding, “[b]ecause
witnesses often simply narrated what they had to tell, it seems likely that
witnesses who had been admitted to testify as to their own direct knowledge
of events might also have mentioned another person’s unsworn statement in
the course of their narrative testimony.”).
25
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that hearsay is generally not admitted, a proposition so clear in
Baynard that it went unchallenged by the prosecutor and was
readily accepted by the court. The case further indicates that the
rule was considerably developed by the time of the case, for all
the participants agreed that there were accepted exceptions to the
general ban that went beyond dying declarations. Indeed, the
court noted that hearsay “is subject to many exceptions.”26
Even though the Baynard court suggested that the offered
hearsay might ordinarily be admissible, the court excluded the
evidence because of the second ground tendered by the defense,
which was that since the decedent-declarant was a slave, he
could not have testified at the trial against the white defendant,
and therefore his hearsay should not be admitted:
[I]t is illegal evidence as proceeding originally from
the mouth of a Negro, and now offered against a
white person in the trial of a criminal charge of a
capital nature. It would be absurd to receive that as
evidence at second hand which could not be received,
even on oath administered in court from the original
person.27
The court agreed, first noting that state laws had limited the
privileges of blacks28 and then concluding:
While these laws and this system continue in force, it
26

State v. Baynard,1794 WL 184, *1 (Del.O. & T. 1794)(emphasis
added).
27
Id.
28
The court listed some of the laws:
Many of our laws recognize the servile state of Negroes among
us and seem to require them to be deprived of many privileges
enjoyed by white persons. By a law made very early after the
settlement of our government, Negroes were not allowed the
trial by jury, nor to carry arms, meet in companies, etc. . . . An
additional penalty is inflicted on the criminal intercourse of the
sexes. . . No Negro can be employed to whip a white
person. . . . By our Constitution, . . . suffrages at elections are
confined to free white persons.
Id. at *1.
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would be both illegal and impolitic to admit the
testimony of Negroes in any cases whatever wherein
white persons are interested . . . . Therefore the
witness can not give in evidence anything which he
heard from Negro Richard.29
A creative interpretation of Baynard could maintain that
since the court concluded that the slave could not have testified
in court, and since it held that his hearsay could not be
admitted, the court was in essence determining that the out-ofcourt statements were “testimonial,” much as a creative
interpretation of Brasier contends. But of course, the court’s
decision did not depend upon the character of the hearsay.
Indeed, the court suggested that the same hearsay from a white
decedent may have been admissible, and the hearsay was not
excluded because it was “testimonial.” The court’s decision
indicates nothing about when hearsay was “testimonial” or that
anything depended on such a label. While it can be deduced that
hearsay that “explain[ed] a narrative of facts” was then
admissible as were dying declarations, Baynard says nothing
about the admissibility of other out-of-court statements. The case
was not about the right of confrontation, a general necessity for
29

Id. at *1. The Delaware courts did not always exclude blacks from
testifying against whites in criminal cases. See State v. Bender, 1793 WL 548
(Del.Quar. Sess.). Where a white man was charged with assaulting a free
black woman, the court noted that Delaware statutes prohibited free blacks
from testifying against whites but also granted free blacks the right “to obtain
redress in law and equity for any injury to their person or property.” Bender,
1793 WL 548 at 1. The court concluded that a criminal charge was a method
of seeking such redress, and where the free black person was the only
witness to the assault, she could testify. The court continued, “[W]e do not
mean to say that a Negro is a witness between two whites, nor in cases like
the present one when other proof can be procured, but only in the case where
justice must otherwise fall.” Bender, 1793 WL 548 at *1. The case is also
reported at State v. Bender, 1793 WL 550 (Del.Quar.Sess.); State v. Bender,
1793 WL 551 (Del.Quar.Sess.); State v. Bender, 1793 WL 554
(Del.Quar.Sess.); and State v. Bender, 1794 WL 556 (Del.Quar.Sess.) But
cf. State v. Farson, 1794 WL 570 (Del.Quar.Sess.) (noting that a free black
called by defendant and charged with assaulting a white person was
prohibited from testifying).
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an opportunity for cross-examination, or whether the hearsay at
issue would otherwise have been admissible; rather, the case
concerned witness competency. The court concluded, similarly
to Brasier, that if a person would not have been a competent incourt witness, then that person’s out-of-court statements were
not admissible.30 Baynard, an American product of the Framing
Era, says little, if anything, about the right to confrontation and
confirms that Brasier said even less.
While these two cases are not truly informative about the
Framing Era views that led to the Confrontation Clause, that
does not mean that examinations of early cases should cease if
that age’s understandings are held to control modern
interpretations of confrontation. The real goal should be not to
gain a better understanding of the English views, but of
American conceptions of the proper use of out-of-court
30

Baynard, 1794 WL 184 at *1. See also Respublica v. Langcake and
Hook, 1795 WL 708 (Pa.). In a trial for “maihem (sic) and assault and
battery,” the defense sought to admit as a dying declaration the out–of-court
statements of the father of one of the defendants. Respublica, 1795 WL 708
at *1. The court concluded that hearsay was generally inadmissible but that
there were exceptions. Among the exceptions were “the declarations of the
deceased person on an indictment for murder, founded principally on the
necessity of the case.” Respublica, 1795 WL 708 at *2. Apparently the court
did not limit this principle just to the declarations of the victim of the
homicide, or at least the court did not find the father’s declaration
inadmissible on that ground. Instead, the court refused to admit the evidence
because the necessary necessity was absent, “there having been several
witnesses present at the different transactions.” Respublica, 1795 WL 708 at
*2. The court, however, went on to find an independent ground for
exclusion, one that mirrored the rulings in Brasier and Baynard. The court
noted that the declarant Thomas Langcake had been bound over as one of the
participants in the crime and that he would have been indicted if he had not
died before the indictments were returned. If indicted he would have been an
interested party and could not have testified. The court concluded, “If
indicted and alive, Thomas Langcake could not have been admitted as a
witness to disprove the present charge. His declarations shortly before his
death surely cannot be received in evidence. . . .” Respublica, 179 WL 708
at *2. Once again, if the declarant would have been an incompetent in-court
witness, his hearsay could not be admitted. See generally Respublica, 179
WL 708.
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statements in criminal trials. The Framers could only have put
their own views into the Sixth Amendment.
English cases may tell us something about that American
understanding, but it would not be surprising in a world of little
and difficult communication across the sea that American views
would not be precisely the same as English notions.
Furthermore, as I have contended elsewhere,31 American
criminal procedure had diverged in significant ways from
English procedure by the time of the Constitution to provide
Americans with a more robust adversary system than England.
The Sixth Amendment, at least in part, rejected English
procedures and constitutionalized practices that had already
emerged in the colonies and new states.32 If the Confrontation
Clause’s purpose was to help ensure a fast-emerging American
adversary system,33 then American sources must be especially
examined, and so far the historical debates engendered by
Crawford and Davis have not truly focused on the American law
of the period.
Unfortunately, relevant and available American case law
from the Framing Era about evidentiary practices in criminal
cases is slight,34 but the information that does exist should be
weighed for what light it can bring to the American use of outof-court statements.

31

See Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause, supra note 2,
at 108-19.
32
For example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel
when that right did not exist in England. See id. at 94-96. See also U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
33
See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 622 (1988) (“correctly interpreted,
the confrontation clause . . . is one of a bundle of rights that assures the
accused the protection of our adversary system. It assures the accused the
right to the adversarial testing of the prosecution’s evidence”).
34
Cf. Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause:
Crawford v. Washington, Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP.
L. REV. 155, 197 (2006) (noting that “we cannot say what hearsay law really
was in the United States in 1789”).
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III. THE ULYSSES
The Ulysses stands as a rare example of American case law
from the Framing Era which concerns evidentiary practices in
criminal cases.35 The case involved Captain Lamb, a cruel and
incompetent Captain, or at least that is what the mutineers
maintained. Eight months after The Ulysses, a merchant ship,
had sailed from Boston, the crew revolted, put the captain in
irons, and placed first officer John Salter in command. Ten days
after the revolt the ship arrived on the west coast of North
America where two other Boston captains interceded, and Lamb
was restored to command. When The Ulysses returned to
Massachusetts, three officers and two seamen were indicted “for
feloniously confining the master of The Ulysses, and
endeavoring to excite a revolt in the ship.”36
Although the defense contended that the defendants’ actions
were justified, the jury convicted the charged officers and
seamen.37 While these events have little significance today, the
court’s opinion contains a long footnote about evidentiary
determinations made during the trial. These rulings by an
American federal court, which gave no indication that it was
making new law, less than a decade after the adoption of the
Sixth Amendment, should be of interest since many concerned
hearsay issues and perhaps say something about Framing Era
views of confrontation.38
35

The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas 515 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No. 14,300).
Id.
37
Id. at 516.
38
Of course, The Ulysses, decided after the Sixth Amendment was
adopted, could not have been an inspiration for the Confrontation Clause, but
the views held in 1800 were unlikely to differ significantly from those held
but a few years earlier. Cases like The Ulysses would seem to reflect the
common understandings of the law in the Framing Era. This mirrors an
argument that Brasier has importance for interpreting confrontation even if
the Framers were unaware of it. See Davies supra note 25, at 89 (noting that
Brasier “and all other cases first reported in Leach’s Crown Cases were
published too late to have come the Framers’ attention prior to the framing of
the Confrontation Clause in 1789”). Champions of Brasier, however,
36
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The starting point for The Ulysses, as it was for Baynard,
was the general inadmissibility of out-of-court statements,
although the federal court announced the prohibition in
somewhat disguised fashion. The Ulysses court stated, “What
others said, when the defendants were not present to contradict,
is no testimony.”39 Hearsay, in other words, was usually
banned.
While prohibiting most out-of-court statements, the court’s
ruling leaves open the possibility that something like tacit
admissions were admissible, and clearly at least some of the
defendants’ direct admissions could be entered into evidence.
The court stated, “If the defendants, before the accusation, were
said to have used expressions, which they did not deny, it is
good evidence, because it is a confession, that they did utter the
expressions.”40
maintain that it is important because it indicates the common understanding of
the law in the Framing Era. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 116. Friedman
notes that:
We should not be distracted by the question of whether Brasier
was known in the United States at the time the Sixth
Amendment was drafted or adopted. In the respect relevant to
the inquiry here, Brasier makes no new law. Rather, its
significance is that it reflects the common understanding of the
time.
Friedman, supra note 16, at 116. Surely, however, American cases tell us
what the relevant views were better than English decisions. See generally
Friedman, supra note 16, at 116.
39
The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. at 516 n.2. Other courts of that era also stated
that hearsay was not generally admissible in criminal cases. See United States
v. Robins, 27 F.Cas. 825, 837 (D.S.C. 1799) (noting that hearsay is not
admissible in cases “affecting . . . life or limb . . .”).
40
The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, 516 n.2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1800) (No.
14,300). One issue concerning an admission in The Ulysses depended on
whether statements could be attributed to a defendant, but after concluding
that they could be, the statements were admitted and the court found that:
It was doubted whether the log book was the record of the mate,
or of the captain. Captains of vessels were produced, who
testified, that the log book is always considered as a record of
truth; that it is the duty of a mate to keep one for the inspection
of the owners of the ship; the mate is not bound to insert therein
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The court also noted, “It was not permitted, that witnesses
should testify, to what others said of the defendants, unless they
were present. It was not permitted to testify, what others said,
respecting expressions, used by defendant, unless they were
present.”41 The court was limiting the use of out-of-court
statements, but there is some ambiguity in the limitation.
Perhaps the court was stating that hearsay could be admitted
only if the in-court declarant was present when the hearsay was
uttered. If so, the rulings prohibited multiple hearsay statements
but nothing more. That interpretation would conflict with the
ruling that statements made outside the presence of the defendant
were not permitted.42 Instead, the second ruling more sensibly
says that hearsay reports of defendants’ admissions were not
admissible unless the in-court witness also heard the admissions.
The “they” refers to “witnesses,” not “others.” The key phrase
in the first statement is “what others said of the defendants,”
which apparently means hearsay reports of the defendants’
actions. The court, to be consistent with its general ban on outof-court statements, was ruling that the in-court witness could
report hearsay only if the in-court witness had firsthand
knowledge of the defendants’ actions reported in the hearsay.
any thing false, even though commanded by the captain, and
therefore a log book may be taken as the confession of the mate.
Id.
In State v. Wells, 1790 WL 349 (N.J.), the court recognized that
admissions could be powerful evidence and should be admitted. The court
rejected the defendant’s contention that evidence of his oral confession should
not be admitted because his written confession had already been introduced,
concluding that if the defense position were adopted:
this monstrous consequence would ensue, that if a criminal had
twenty times acknowledged the commission of a fact, and should
afterwards refuse to confess it, upon an examination before the
justice, for the very purpose of preventing any proof of his
former acknowledgments, he would, by his own act, defeat the
ends of justice.
Wells, 1790 WL 349 at *4.
41
24 F.Cas. at 516 n.2.
42
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Both rulings appear to permit the hearsay only when the out-ofcourt statements would corroborate what the in-court witness
testified to. This conclusion is buttressed by the court’s specific
ruling that admitted prior out-of-court statements of an in-court
witness not just to impeach,43 but also to corroborate the
witness. The court stated, “Evidence to show, that a witness has
given an account of a transaction, similar to what he has
testified, is good corroboration of his testimony. And so vice
versa.”44
The Ulysses court also made a number of rulings about
depositions that undercut Crawford’s conclusion that a deposition
could be validly admitted in the Framing Era if the defendant
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the
statement’s taking and if the declarant were unavailable. The
Ulysses court stated a different general proposition about
depositions: “In criminal prosecutions, depositions are not
admitted as regular evidence, unless by mutual consent.”45 A
43

See also State v. Norris, 1796 WL 327, at *4 (N.C. Super.L & Eq.
1796) (describing where a prosecutor was allowed to impeach his own
witness with prior statements).
44
The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, 516 n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). The court,
however, did not allow all impeachment by prior statements. It was claimed
that the witness P. Robinson “had told the American consul, in Canton, a
story differing in some considerable circumstances from the testimony which
had given in court.” Id. The court, however, would not allow questioning
about this, stating “he was not bound to criminate himself.” Id. On the other
hand, Robinson’s account of the events written shortly after the captain’s
reinstatement was admitted to corroborate his in-court testimony. Id.
45
Id. Some Framing Era cases did not admit defendant’s statements
made in an examination before trial if the statements were not properly
recorded. See, e.g., State v. Grove, 1794 WL 80 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq.
1796) (noting that a defendant’s examination before a magistrate was not
admitted because it was not recorded within two days) and United States v.
Maunier, 26 F.Cas 1210 (C.C.D.N.C. 1792) (describing how a defendant’s
examination before trial was not admitted because it was not signed by the
prisoner). See also State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424, 1790 WL 349, at *4 (N.J.
1790) (noting that the court takes “the law to be, that parole evidence of the
confession before the justice would be improper. . . “). But see State v.
Irwin, 1794 WL 105, at *1 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1794), where the court
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concern over cross-examination was part of the animating force
for this mutual-consent rule. In The Ulysses, parties had agreed
to the taking of a deposition from one Sturges, but after its
apparent completion, “some addition was made to it.” The
prosecutor John Davis objected to the deposition’s admission,
and the court excluded the evidence, stating, “Though this
addition might have been true, yet Mr. Davis had no opportunity
to cross-examine Sturgis on this point.”46
admitted defendant’s confession before a Justice of the Peace even though it
was not properly recorded by the Justice. The court stated:
There is certainly an impropriety in saying, that evidence may
be received of a confession made before a private man, and that
the same confession made before a Justice shall not, because he
hath omitted to perform his duty. . . . [I]f the justice should not
do his duty . . . , that shall not be of so much prejudice to the
state that the evidence shall be lost.
Irwin, 1794 WL 105, at *2.
46
The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, 516 n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). Other cases
from the era indicated the importance of cross-examination and its connection
to hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 1794 WL 98 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq.
1794), where the court refused to admit a deposition not because it was
labeled “testimonial” evidence but because of the “rule of the common law,
founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which
he had not the liberty to cross examine. . . .” Webb, 1794 WL 98, at *1.
One court of the era recognized that out-of-court statements should be
admitted when cross-examination of the absent declarant would have been to
no purpose. Schwartz v. Thomas, 1795 WL 529 (1795). In a slander action,
the court admitted a letter from an absent declarant indicating that he had
heard of the slander. The proponent of the letter said it was offered not for
showing that the defendant had uttered the slander but to prove the extent of
damages by establishing that the slander had spread. One of the judges
concluded, “If the letter had not only stated that the report was known to the
writer but had also averred that the plaintiff[-in-error] had propagated the
report, such averment would have been inadmissible to prove this latter
fact. . . .” Schwartz, 1795 WL 529, at *3. Since, however, crossexamination of the letter writer could not have undercut the probative force
of the letter to show the slander’s circulation, the letter was admissible. The
judge stated:
that the report had circulated so as to come to the knowledge of
the writer, is as clearly established by the letter itself, as if he
had deposed to the same effect . . . , and no cross examination
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Even when there was an opportunity for cross-examination at
the deposition, however, a deposition was still not admissible
without mutual consent. Defendant Salter had offered a
deposition from someone not named. The court noted that the
deponent had relevant evidence, and the defendant had no legal
method of detaining the deponent. This time no mention was
made that the prosecutor had been denied the opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent, but even so, the court indicated that
it could not admit the deposition without the prosecutor’s
consent. The court simply stated, “I have said, depositions are
not legal evidence in criminal prosecutions.”47 The court,
however, did show a concern that the defendant received a fair
trial and obtained the prosecutor’s consent. The opinion noted,
If the attorney for the district will not agree to the
admission of this deposition, the cause must be
continued. A similar determination of Lord Mansfield
was quoted, in which he was said to have asserted, if
the deposition were not admitted, the cause should be
continued forever. The attorney agreed.48
could possibly do away a conviction that he who spoke of the
report, had heard it.
Schwartz, 1795 WL 529, at *3. The other judge similarly concluded:
this case is very different from what it would have been, had the
letter been produced to prove the speaking of the words, or the
propagation of the report by the defendant. In the one case the
party might have derived benefit from the cross examination of
the writer, in the present case, it would have been impossible.
Schwartz, 1795 WL 529, at *4.
47
24 F.Cas. at 516, n.2.
48
The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). See also United
States v. Moore, 26 F.Cas. 1308 (D. Pa. 1801), where the defendant was
charged with a shipboard manslaughter. Defense asked for the trial to be
delayed because two witnesses had shipped out again but were expected back
at the next court term. The defense lawyers said that they had proposed to the
prosecutor that depositions of the witnesses be taken where the prosecutor
could have cross-examined, but the prosecutor refused to participate in the
deposition. The prosecutor opposed the continuance stating that the defense
should have moved to have their witnesses bound over as he had done with a
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Another ruling on depositions stated, “Where there are
several defendants, and one consents to the taking of a
deposition, that deposition may not affect the other defendants,
who did not consent to the taking of the deposition.”49 A
deposition was not admissible simply because the accused might
have been cross-examined at a deposition, for presumably if the
defendants had consented, they would have been able to crossexamine at the out-of-court proceeding. Instead, the mutual
consent did more than simply preserve cross-examination; it
allowed the parties to choose to have the cross-examination in
front of the jury.50
number of prosecution witnesses, concluding that a trial delay would be
unfair to the prosecution witnesses who were jailed pending the trial. After
arguments about whether the defense would have had the authority to have
their witnesses committed, the court continued the trial and ordered the
release of the prosecution witnesses on the condition that their depositions be
taken with the opportunity for defense cross-examination at the depositions.
See generally Moore, 26 F.Cas. 1308.
49
24 F.Cas. at 516, n.2.
50
The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. 515, n.2 (D. Mass. 1800). Defense attorneys
of that era were arguing not just the importance of cross-examination, but the
importance of cross-examination in front of the jury deciding the case. See
United States v. Moore, 26 F.Cas. 1308 (D. Pa. 1801), where after the court
suggested that depositions of prosecution witnesses could be taken, defense
counsel responded:
We have great objections to the depositions of these sailors. We
wish to examine them in court and before the jury. We have
good reason to suspect a conspiracy among them to fix this
crime on the defendant. They have evinced the greatest heat and
resentment towards him. A viva voce examination before the
jury is necessary to our safety. On depositions, though we crossexamine, we shall lose the manner, appearance, temper, &c., of
the witnesses, so important in weighing their credit.
Moore, 26 F.Cas. at 1308. See also United States v. Smith, 3 Wheeler C.C.
100, 27 F.Cas. 1192, 1218 (D. N.Y. 1806), where defense counsel refused
to consent to a commission examining absent witnesses and insisted on the
importance of cross-examination in front of the jury, stating:
Even in civil cases, I have more than once had occasion to
lament the inroads that are made upon oral testimony, by the
increased use of written depositions; and I am convinced that the
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Perhaps most important in light of Crawford, the court
nowhere indicated that the “testimonial” factor weighed into its
decisions whatsoever, or that the court was even aware of such a
concept. Indeed, the last of the court’s rulings on hearsay
indicated that nothing depended on whether the out-of court
statements were “testimonial” or not. The court stated, “Where
a private journal was produced, that journal may be used against
its author, but not against the other defendants.”51 A private
journal is not the product of interrogation, much less
governmental questioning. It bears little if any resemblance to an
ex parte affidavit or deposition. Even though today it would be
“nontestimonial” hearsay and could be admitted without
violating the Confrontation Clause, it was not admissible against
those who had not written it. That ruling, of course, followed
from the court’s general proposition that hearsay was not
admissible; that is “what others said [including another
defendant], when the defendants were not present to contradict,
is no testimony.”52
The Ulysses says nothing directly about the right of
confrontation, but it does show a Framing Era court’s concern
about the use of out-of-court statements in a criminal case. Most
important was its general prohibition of such evidence. The
court allowed breaches to the ban, but they were quite limited
with the court only permitting admissions, depositions taken by
mutual consent, and out-of-court statements that would
corroborate or impeach in-court testimony.53
latter frequently prevent the discovery of truth. Everyone knows
that when a witness is examined in open court, the manner in
which he answer, and the manner in which he declines to
answer, are matters of public observation; and that crossexamination may draw out more than could be obtained by
studied and written answers to written interrogatories.
Smith, 27 F.Cas. at 1215.
51
The Ulysses, 24 F.Cas. at 516, n.2.
52
Id.
53
At least one American judge cast doubt about the admissibility of a
deposition even if it had been properly taken. See State v. Moody, 1798 WL
93 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq.), where in a murder trial, statements made by the
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Of course, the case does not state whether excited utterances
about an ongoing emergency from an absent declarant were
admissible or not. The case is silent on the distinction drawn in
Davis,54 but the case certainly undercuts the notion that the
deceased on the day after he was wounded to a Justice of the Peace were
offered as dying declarations. Since, however, the declarant did not die until
weeks later, the court did not admit the statements because they were not
made when the declarant was without hope of life. Judge Haywood, however,
suggested that the statements might be admissible as an examination under
oath before a Justice of the Peace. The defense attorney objected that the
declarant was first examined and then later sworn to the truth of the contents,
rather than being sworn before he was examined. Judge Haywood, “thinking
there might be something in [the defense] objection, did not insist upon
receiving the testimony.” Id. at *1. While this might indicate that a
deposition could be admitted when the proper forms were followed, the other
judge gave broader grounds for the exclusion, which would have prevented
its admission even if the deposition had been properly taken. Judge Stone
stated, “I cannot think this paper is receivable at any rate; how is it possible
a man can be a witness to prove his own death?” Id.
54
The fact that courts had expressed concerns over admitting hearsay
does not mean that courts did not also admit hearsay without reporting an
explanation. See, e.g., State v. Negro George, 1797 WL 403
(Del.Quar.Sess.) (describing where the report summarizes the testimony of
many witnesses some of whom report the out-of-court statements of others).
Thus, a prosecution witness testified that the owner of the defendant slave
stated shortly after the crime that he (the owner) believed the defendant had
been on the plantation at the relevant time. The reported opinion does not
indicate any objection to this hearsay, but the owner’s declaration was
exculpatory, and the owner later testified to the same effect. The prosecution
witness, however, also testified that defendant’s mother stated that the
defendant had shoes, an important issue because shoe prints had been found
near the crime scene. This hearsay, however, seems to have been an
explanation of the in-court testimony of how the witness came to compare the
defendant’s shoes to the imprints at the scene. The witness testified that after
the mother’s statement, the defendant produced his shoes, and the witness
told the jury about the comparison he made. The hearsay was not the central
evidence for the prosecution, which relied on the identification of the victim.
Id.
See also State v. Lough, 1803 WL 750 (Del Quar.Sess.) (noting that in a
trial for horse stealing, a witness said that when he saw the horse someone
else told him that it was stolen and the evidence was not crucial because the
owner of the horse had already testified as to its theft).
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admissibility of hearsay in the Framing Era depended on
whether or not out-of-court statements were “testimonial.”
Indeed, the court gave no indication that the court was even
aware of such a distinction.
Perhaps most important, nothing in The Ulysses or any of
the other cases cited here or that have been discussed in the
aftermath of Crawford and Davis demonstrate that Framing Era
prosecutions were upheld or even undertaken when the crucial
evidence against the accused was an out-of-court statement of an
absent witness, whether or not that hearsay was “testimonial.”
The thought of such prosecutions never seems to have even
occurred then.55
What The Ulysses and the various cases previously discussed
suggest is that American courts were seeking to provide fair,
adversarial trials, and decisions about the use of out-of-court
statements were just part of that concern. What The Ulysses
should really teach is that the hearsay determinations of the
Framing Era cannot be meaningfully analyzed apart from an
analysis of the evolving criminal trial system as a whole, and
that the Confrontation Clause should not be interpreted as if it
can be segregated from related provisions in the Constitution.56
CONCLUSION
If a common law right to confrontation existed, it cannot be
found in Rex v. Brasier, as some have contended. That case
articulates no general principles about hearsay or confrontation.
The similar American case of State v. Baynard, however, does
suggest that in American courts during the Framing Era courts
were announcing that hearsay was generally inadmissible, and
The Ulysses further indicates that hearsay exceptions in
American courts during that period were limited. Most
55

See supra note 54.
See Jonakait, supra note 2, at 198 (noting that Crawford’s definition
of “witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause conflicts with the use of that term
in other parts of the Constitution and “Crawford’s analysis ignores
confrontation’s Sixth Amendment context.”).
56
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important, however, for the modern eye, none of the discussed
cases show any concern over a distinction between “testimonial”
and “nontestimonial” hearsay.
Perhaps the approach of Crawford and Davis is a good one,
but it is not one that has proven support from the historical
record. We cannot know if the Framers of the Confrontation
Clause would have found the distinction that the Court has
articulated between the companion cases in Davis important,
because the Framers, for practical purposes, said nothing about
how they viewed that constitutional provision. But nothing in the
historical record so far brought forth indicates that the
distinction would have made any sense to them at all. Instead,
what Crawford and Davis have done, it seems, is to launch
something like a new common law of evidence where the
language of those decisions has to be parsed without real
reference to history or Sixth Amendment principles, for
guidance on how new cases should be decided.

